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Professor Koplow is to be commended for authoring a comprehen-
sive and especially cogent analysis of the debate over the Reagan Ad-
ministration's 1985 reinterpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. His article and the accompanying written commenta-
ries provided by legal scholars and policy participants should make an
important contribution to public understanding of the basic constitu-
tional principles which were upheld in the course of this protracted
confrontation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of our
government.
In his article, Professor Koplow appropriately focuses on the
broader legal dimensions of the reinterpretation dispute. In so doing, he
underscores the extent to which the issue raised by the reinterpretation
went far beyond this particular treaty and its application to the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. What was fundamentally at
stake, he notes, was the important role assigned to the Senate under the
Constitution as a co-equal partner with the President in the making of
treaties, and the reliability of the United States as a negotiating partner
in the international arena.
Professor Koplow's well-written and well-reasoned article per-
forms a particularly valuable service in highlighting what ultimately
became the bottom-line issue in this disagreement: whether a specific
"means test" proposed by senior legal officials in the Reagan Adminis-
tration had to be satisfied before Executive Branch communications to
the Senate during ratification proceedings would be treated as binding
on all future Presidents under domestic law.
In an April 9, 1987 Justice Department opinion written by Assis-
tant Attorney General Charles Cooper, the Justice Department ac-
knowledged that in certain instances the President would be "estopped"
from making an interpretation that conflicted with what the Senate was
told at the time of ratification:
If . .. the ratification record unequivocally shows that the
President presented the treaty to the Senate based on spe-
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cific, official representations regarding the meaning of an
ambiguous provision, that the Senate regarded that under-
standing as important to its consent, and that the Senate re-
lied on the representations made by the Executive Branch in
approving the treaty (and thus in refraining from attaching a
formal reservation setting forth the understanding), we be-
lieve that the President would, in effect, be estopped from
taking a contrary position in his subsequent interpretation of
the treaty, just as he would be bound by a formal reservation
or understanding passed by the Senate to the same effect.'
This recognition that Executive Branch testimony during the rati-
fication proceedings could-at least in certain circumstances-be bind-
ing on future Presidents' positions appeared to contradict testimony a
month earlier by the State Department Legal Adviser, Judge Abraham
Sofaer. Judge Sofaer testified that "when it [the Senate] gives its advice
and consent to a treaty, it is to the treaty that was made, irrespective of
the explanations it is provided." 2 This proposition became known as
the "Sofaer Doctrine."
The Justice Department's acknowledgment that ratification testi-
mony would be binding on future Presidents was endorsed one year
later in a March 17, 1988 letter to Senator Lugar from White House
Counsel Arthur Culvahouse. In the Culvahouse letter, the White
House contended that Presidents would be bound by Executive Branch
representations to the Senate at the time of ratification-but only if
those communications met a specific "means test." According to
Culvahouse, Executive Branch testimony should be treated as binding
only it if was: (1) "authoritatively communicated"; (2) "clearly in-
tended"; and (3) "generally understood and relied upon by the Senate
in its advice and consent to ratification."'
For advocates of reinterpreting the ABM Treaty, the attraction of
the Culvahouse means test was that it afforded the Executive Branch a
virtually unlimited set of options for disavowing the binding effect of
ratification testimony presented by previous administrations. As the
New York Times noted, "[s]ince it's hard to know what this mumbo-
' Memo from Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper to State Department
Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer (Apr. 9, 1987).
2 The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 130 (1987).
' Letter from White House Counsel Arthur B. Culvahouse to Senator Richard D.
Lugar 3 (Mar. 17, 1988), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE
INF TREATY, S. ExEc. REP. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 438, 440 (1988).
[Vol. 137:1523
COMMON UNDERSTANDING
jumbo means, Presidents would be free to do with treaties as they
wish."
4
If a future President wanted to evade the obligations flowing from
a particular treaty interpretation presented to the Senate at the time of
ratification, that administration could declare that the Executive
Branch official who presented the testimony in question was not "au-
thoritative." The requirement of authoritativeness appears commonsen-
sical at first blush, and the Senate agreed in principle that it could not
expect to rely on representations which were not authoritative. How-
ever, efforts by the Reagan Administration to discount as
"nonauthoritative" 1972 ABM Treaty testimony by certain senior
Nixon Administration officials-including the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering-revealed the pro-
posed rule's potential for abuse.
If a future President preferred not to try to exploit the "authorita-
tive witness" loophole, that administration could turn to either of the
two other escape clauses incorporated in the Culvahouse/Sofaer crite-
ria. For example, a future President could assert that particular testi-
mony could be disregarded because it was not "generally understood"
by Senators who voted on the treaty. How would one determine what
may or may not have been in the minds of Senators who heard the
testimony or reviewed the hearing prints? Alternatively, that adminis-
tration could claim-as was done in the ABM case-that the ratifica-
tion record does not provide sufficient indication that all or most Sena-
tors "relied upon" a particular body of testimony in voting on the
treaty. Again, how is one to determine what testimony was or was not
on the minds of particular Senators at the time they cast their votes?
If the Senate had accepted all three components of the Culvahouse
means test and carried it to its logical conclusion, Senators would have
had no recourse during the INF ratification proceedings but to have
both affirmed that each witness was "authoritative" (as we in fact did),
and to have paused after each bit of testimony and made it a matter of
record that they regarded each statement as clearly intended, generally
understood, and one on which they would rely. Such an approach
would not only have placed an inordinate burden on the Senate, it also
would have made a mockery of Senate ratification proceedings.
In lieu of the straightjacket which would have been imposed on
the Senate by the Culvahouse criteria, the Senate adopted a "treaty
interpretation amendment" to the resolution of ratification accompany-
" The Doctrine or the Treaty?, N. Y. Times, May 5, 1988, at A30, col. 1
(editorial).
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ing the INF Treaty which incorporated a more comprehensive and
common-sense definition, based on the treaty clauses of the Constitu-
tion, of what constituted binding testimony. The provision, known as
the Byrd-Biden Amendment, provided that the INF Treaty must be
interpreted by future Presidents "in accordance with the common un-
derstanding of the Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the
time the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification."'5 The
Amendment declared that this "common understanding" was based on:
(A) First, the text of the Treaty and the provisions of this
resolution of ratification; and
(B) Second, the authoritative representations which were
provided by the President and his representatives to the Sen-
ate and its Committees, in seeking Senate consent to ratifica-
tion, insofar as such representations were directed to the
meaning and legal effect of the text of the Treaty."
During the Senate debate on the Byrd-Biden Amendment, Senator
Specter argued that it should be defeated because, inter alia, the
amendment's definition of what constituted a "common understanding"
of the treaty's meaning did not enumerate the three criteria of the
Culvahouse means test.' Rejecting this and other criticisms, the Senate
on May 26, 1988 adopted the Biden-Byrd Amendment by an over-
whelming and bipartisan vote of 72-27."
Although supporters of the Byrd-Biden Amendment thought that
this vote had resolved the issue, Senator Specter pursued the debate
further the following day. The Senator urged an amendment to qualify
the Byrd-Biden Amendment by adding the following sentence:
Such common understanding means a shared interpretation
which is both authoritatively communicated to the Senate by
the Executive and clearly intended, generally understood,
and relied upon by the State [sic; should be "Senate"] in its
advice and consent to ratification.9
Senator Specter performed an important service in ensuring that
the Culvahouse means test would be put to a clear-cut vote. Following
an extensive debate in which the opposing sides forcefully and intelli-
gently argued their respective cases, the Senate rejected the amend-
5 134 CONG. REC. S6725 (daily ed. May 20, 1988).
6 Id.
See id. at S6778-80.
8 See id. at S6783-84.
134 CONG. REc. S6884 (daily ed. May 27, 1988).
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ment-and with it what remained of the Sofaer Doctrine-by a bipar-
tisan vote of 67-30.10
With the passage of time, I am confident that the Senate's rejec-
tion of the Sofaer Doctrine will be regarded as one of its finest hours.
As previously noted, however, more was at stake in this long struggle
than the Senate's constitutional powers and responsibilities. For had the
precedent been established that the original meaning of a treaty could
be unilaterally changed by a future President, our Nation's reliability
as a negotiating partner could have been called into question, with de-
structive consequences for the conduct of United States foreign policy.
Professor Koplow's article will help ensure that these lessons are not
forgotten.
10 See id. at S6884-90.
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